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I.

INTRODUCTION

The history of municipal power in West Virginia reflects a consistent
and persistent judicial suppression of local initiative and control interspersed by
several popular attempts to loosen the judicial grip, expressed through both
constitutional and legislative efforts. The most recent effort was the West
Virginia Legislature's 2019 enactment of a home rule law that made permanent
a program that had existed in various forms as a pilot project. Section 8-1-5a of
the West Virginia Code creates a Home Rule Board and enables municipalities
approved by the Board to exercise a considerable degree of local autonomy.
This Article explores the history behind home rule and examines the
West Virginia Legislature's most recent attempt to facilitate it. The Article first
provides background on the general development of local government powers
and then focuses on the particular history in West Virginia. That history exposes
one of the most blatant demonstrations of judicial nullification of popular
sentiment that exists. The Article then turns to the most recent developments: a
pilot home rule program and a subsequent statute making it permanent. Finally,
the Article concludes by discussing an attempt to challenge the program's
constitutionality.

John W. Fisher, II Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law. The Author
wishes to acknowledge the support for this Article provided by the Hodges Trust Fund at the WVU
College of Law.
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Although West Virginia's experience reflects those in a large number of
states, the statute that has emerged also offers some innovative strategies for
promoting localism in the state.

II. LOCAL GOVERNMENT POWERS GENERALLY
Since at least the post-Civil War period, the default rule for local
government power in the United States has been that local governments are
creatures of the state that derive their existence and powers from state law.' (The
federal Constitution makes no provision for local governmental units.) This view
was solidified by the widespread adoption of "Dillon's Rule," which is named
after Justice John F. Dillon of the Iowa Supreme Court, who formulated it in an
2
1868 decision (Merriam v. Moody 's Executors ) and in his treatise
3
Commentaries on the Law ofMunicipal Corporations. He wrote:
[A] municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the
following powers and no others: First, those granted in express
words; second, those necessarily implied or necessarily incident
to the powers expressly granted; third, those absolutely essential
to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation-not
simply convenient, but indispensable; fourth, any fair doubt as
to the existence of a power is resolved by the courts against the
corporation-against the existence of the power.'
Although Dillon wrote specifically about cities, his rule was readily applied to
define the powers of counties and other forms of local government.' Judges were

I
See, e.g., Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907) ("The state,... at its
pleasure, may modify or withdraw all [municipal] powers, may take without compensation such
property, hold it itself, or vest it in other agencies, expand or contract the territorial area, unite the
whole or a part of it with another municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation.");
Booten v. Pinton, 77 W. Va. 412, 421, 89 S.E. 985, 989 (1915) (concluding that municipalities
"are mere creatures of the Legislature, exercising certain delegated governmental functions which
the Legislature may revoke at will").
2
25 Iowa 163, 170 (1868).
1 JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 237-39
3
(5th ed. 1911).
4
Merriam, 25 Iowa at 170.
See, e.g., State ex rel. Cty. Court v. Arthur, 150 W. Va. 293, 145 S.E.2d 34 (1965); Willard
5
D. Lorensen, Rethinking the West Virginia Municipal Code of 1969, 97 W. VA. L. REv. 653, 659
(1995). Dillon's Rule
reflects the view of local governments as agents of the state by requiring that all local
powers be traced back to a specific delegation: whenever it is uncertain whether a locality
possesses a particular power, a court should assume that the locality lacks that power.
By denying localities broad authority, Dillon's Rule limits the number of entities that
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enamored with the rule because it gave courts enormous discretion to invalidate
laws they considered unwise or burdensome on local taxpayers and promoted the
laissez-faire economic philosophy dominant in the second half of the 19th
century. 6
Home rule laws were put forth as an antidote to the courts' miserly
interpretation of local government powers. "Home rule" is a generic term for
statutory and state constitutional provisions that attempt to bestow on local
governments some degree of local autonomy and discretion and to avoid the
necessity (imposed by Dillon's Rule) of having to run to the legislature to gain
express authorization for every exercise of local power.7 Home rule laws vary
widely in design and form, but they basically either bestow the ability to initiate
policies at the local level (the power of initiative) or protect against state override
(the power of immunity)--or they perform both functions. 8
In very general terms, home rule laws have taken two shapes: imperium
in imperio (i.e., a sovereign within a sovereign) or "legislative home rule." The
former term describes the original home rule law, which was created by Missouri
in 1875 for the City of St. Louis 9 and emulated by other jurisdictions.'o This form

may regulate private activity. Only through a clear and express state delegation may a
locality obtain power to govern.
Richard Briffault, Our Localism: PartI-The Structure ofLocal Government Law, 90 COLUM. L.
REv. 1, 8 (1990).
6
See, e.g., Robert M. Bastress, Jr., Constitutional Considerationsfor Local Government
Reform in West Virginia, 108 W. VA. L. REv. 125, 145 (2005); Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal
Concept, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1059, 1110 (1980); see also Lorensen, supra note 5, at 659 (suggesting
that Dillon's endurance may be attributable to its "blessing of simplicity and the lure of reserving
to the judiciary the power to substitute its policy choices for those of locally elected officials").
7
An unfortunate side effect of obtaining specific legislation authorizing a particular local
power was that courts often interpreted the statutory grants as implicitly confining the scope of the
power and thus excluding related powers not specifically granted. See, e.g., Dotson v. City of
Ames, 101 N.W.2d 711, 714 (Iowa 1960) ("[B]y granting control over animals running at large[,]
the legislature has clearly excluded power over those confined."); cf ANTONIN SCALA & BRYAN
A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 107 (2012) (describing the

corresponding canon of statutory interpretation-viz., expressio unius est exclusio alteriuswhich holds that "[t]he expression of one thing implies the exclusion of others").
8

RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE AND LOCAL

GOvERNMENT LAW 346-47 (8th ed. 2016) (first citing GORDON L. CLARK, JUDGES AND THE CITIES:
INTERPRETING LOCAL AUTONOMY 7 (1985); then quoting City of New Orleans v. Bd. of Comm'rs,

640 So. 2d 237, 242 (La. 1994)).
9
See City of St. Louis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 149 U.S. 465, 467-68 (1893) (noting that the
city's power stems from its own charter, which was authorized by the state constitution of 1875).
1o
This Author has previously argued that the first home rule law was enacted three years
earlier with West Virginia's adoption of its 1872 constitution and the creation of what is now
Article IX, Section 13, which conferred on counties the power to create their own forms of
government. Robert M. Bastress, Jr., Localism and the West Virginia Constitution, 109 W. VA. L.
REv. 683, 707-09 (2007). Unfortunately, the Supreme Court of Appeals gutted the local supremacy
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created an initiative power and a supremacy for local governments with regards
to their local "affairs" or "subjects" (or some similar term). Judicial hostility to
such laws resulted in an extremely narrow construction of what were "municipal
affairs" or a very broad interpretation of legislative ability to override the local
law." In response to that hostility, localism advocates proposed an alternative
strategy that authorized local governments to enact any law not in conflict with
federal law, the state constitution, or state statute. This strategy was designed to
shift the scope of defining home rule powers from the courts (and their hostility)
to the legislatures (and their greater amenability).1 2 This became known as
"legislative home rule."' 3
III. WEST VIRGINIA'S HISTORY OF MUNICIPAL POWER
West Virginia was an early and faithful adherent of Dillon's Rule.14

Under the state's 1872 constitution, the legislature prescribed municipal

5
charters-except for towns with populations of fewer than 2,000 people.' The
state pushed its dominance over local governance to the maximum when in 1915
the state enacted legislation that erased the Williamson City Council and replaced
it with a government to be appointed by the governor, all of which was sustained
by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Booten v. Pinson.16
In 1929, after years of calls for constitutional reform, Governor William
Conley appointed a Constitutional Review Commission to study the state's
constitution and recommend changes.' 7 That Commission filed its report in 1930,

provided by Section 13 in Committee to Reform Hampshire County Government v. Thompson, 223
W. Va. 346, 674 S.E.2d 207 (2008), and thereby refuted the contention that West Virginia
pioneered home rule. ROBERT M. BASTRESS, JR., THE WEST VIRGINIA STATE CONSTITUTION 27882 (2d ed. 2016).
"
See, e.g., BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 8, at 347-49 (quoting City of New Orleans,
640 So. 2d at 242-43).
12
See id. at 347.
Id. at 348.
Syl. Pt. 4, Christie 'v. Malden, 23 W. Va. 667 (1884). For later decisions applying the rule,
see Lorensen, supra note 5, at 659 nn.18-19.
W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 39. This section also denied the legislature the power to enact local
'
or special laws regarding other local subjects, most notably to regulate or change county or district
affairs. Id. The Supreme Court of Appeals has rendered this provision virtually useless. See
Bastress, supra note 10, at 696-97; see also Bastress, supra note 6, at 141-44.
6
77 W. Va. 412, 89 S.E. 985 (1915). The governor at the time, Henry Hatfield, was an
extremely forceful figure and was in a dispute with the government in Williamson, so he convinced
the legislature to enact a law eliminating that government and giving him the power to handpick
the successor.
17
BASTRESS, supra note 10, at 27.
13

14
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and either the legislature or the voters rejected all of its recommendations'
save one. In 1936, the electorate approved adding the "Home Rule Amendment"
to the state constitution as Article VI, Section 39a.1 9 That amendment follows:

§ 39(a). Home Rule for Municipalities. No local or special law
shall hereafter be passed incorporating cities, towns or villages,
or amending their charters. The legislature shall provide by
general laws for the incorporation and government of cities,
towns and villages and shall classify such municipal
corporations, upon the basis of population, into not less than two
nor more than five classes. Such general laws shall restrict the
powers of such cities, towns and villages to borrow money and
contract debts, and shall limit the rate of taxes for municipal
purposes, in accordance with section one, article ten of the
Constitution of the State of West Virginia. Under such general
laws, the electors of each municipal corporation, wherein the
population exceeds two thousands, shall have power and
authority to frame, adopt and amend the charter of such
corporation, or to amend an existing charter thereof, and through
its legally constituted authority, may pass all laws and
ordinances relating to its municipal affairs: Provided, that any
such charter or amendment thereto, and any such law or
ordinance so adopted, shall be invalid and void if inconsistent or
in conflict with this Constitution or the General Laws of the
State then in effect, or thereafter, from time to time enacted.2 0

Bastress, supra note 10, 698-99; see also Robert E. DiClerico, The West Virginia
Constitution: Securing the PopularInterest, in THE CONSTITUTIONALISM OF AMERICAN STATES

216, 230 (George E. Connor & Christopher W. Hammons eds., 2008) (opining that "the political
crosscurrents .. . proved so strong that the legislature declined to accept the commission's report").
19
The Commission described its proposed provision as follows:
[This] would be a new section intended to provide for what is commonly
known as Municipal Home Rule. Under the provisions of this proposed
section, cities, towns and villages would be classified according to population
and a general law passed to govern the municipalities of each class. City
charters would no longer be amended by the Legislature but would be amended
by the local communities in accordance with general law, -thus eliminating
much special legislation and the evils incident thereto. The form and efficiency
of municipal government are necessarily local subjects and any defects therein
in the last analysis can only be corrected by the electors of the locality
involved. The granting or amending by the Legislature of special charters has
solved no problem of municipal government. The volume of legislation upon
this subject would seem to condemn the present method. Under present method
the electors of a community have been, or feel that they have been, deprived
of the inherent right of governing themselves in local affairs.
D.J.F. STROTHER ET AL., W. VA. CONST. COMM'N, THE CONSTITUTION OF WEST VIRGINIA 15 (1930),
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015030826849&view-lup&seq=1.
20
W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 39a.
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The section obviously did away with legislative enactments chartering cities,
although it took decades for gradual implementation of locally adopted charters.
But that did happen. The section also set forth a form of legislative home rule: a
city could enact any ordinance to promote its municipal affairs that was not in
conflict with federal or state law. Yeah, right.
The Supreme Court of Appeals, in its first decision interpreting Section
39a, declared that the section had constitutionalized Dillon's Rule. 2 1 Did the term
"home rule" not mean anything? Subsequent decisions persisted to apply
Dillon's Rule to municipal powers questions 22 and to ignore the intent behind
and the literal language of Section 39a.2 3
In 1969, the legislature overhauled the state's Municipal Code.24 In part,
the legislature's purpose was to eliminate the disarray that had developed
following the 1936 enactment of Article VI, Section 39a and the subsequent
establishment of two separate municipal codes-one for cities with municipal
charters created by the legislature prior to 1936 and another for cities that had
created their own charters pursuant to the Section 39a-granted power. 25 The dual
track had brought about confusion and unfairness; one municipal code for all
cities (subject to distinctions in treatment between cities based on population 26
promoted clarity and ease of application. A second legislative purpose, however,
can readily be gleaned from several provisions of the West Virginia Code: a
purpose to confer greater powers and discretion on cities and a plea to courts to
let them exercise those enhancements.
Of particular note was the inclusion of Section 8-1-7, which specifically
stated that the powers granted by the chapter (i.e., by the Municipal Code) "shall
not operate to exclude the exercise of other powers and authority fairly incidental
thereto or reasonably implied and within the purposes of this chapter." 2 7 In 2007,
the legislature added the language "or in accordance with the Home Rule
Amendment to the constitution of this state." 28 The section further stated that
"[t]he provisions of the chapter shall be given full effect without regardto the
Brackman's, Inc. v. City of Huntington, 126 W. Va. 21, 24,27 S.E.2d 71, 73 (1943); see also
Bastress, supra note 6, at 145-47.
22
See, e.g., Rogers v. City of South Charleston, 163 W. Va. 285, 256 S.E.2d 557 (1979); Toler
v. City of Huntington, 153 W. Va. 313, 168 S.E.2d 551 (1969); State ex rel. Plymale v. City of
Huntington, 147 W. Va. 728, 131 S.E.2d 160 (1963); Bastress, supra note 6, at 145-51.
23
See supra text accompanying note 20.
24
BASTRESS, supra note 10, at 200; Lorensen, supra note 5.
21

25

Id

Those distinctions in treatment have always, to some extent, been part of West Virginia law.
See, e.g., W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 39 (prohibiting the legislature from enacting charters for towns
under 2,000). In any event, Article VI, Section 39a mandated the creation of different classes of
cities based on population. See supra text accompanying note 19.
27
W. VA. CODE. ANN. § 8-1-7(a) (West 2020).
28
Id. (emphasis added).
26
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common-law rule ofstrict construction."29 But this guidance mattered little to the
Supreme Court of Appeals.
In its first case applying Section 8-1-7, Rogers v. City of South
Charleston,3 0 the Supreme Court of Appeals held that a statute according cities
the power to sell or convey real estate did not include the power to enter into a
contract creating an option for a person to buy city property (even though there
was no statute precluding it). Cities enjoy only such powers as are expressly
granted by the Legislature or are necessarily implied. As for Section 8-1-7, the
court stated it only "relaxes the common law rule of strict construction and does
not lift all restrictions on municipal power."" Subsequent decisions on municipal
power have continued to cite with approval Dillon's Rule of limited municipal
power. 32

The 1969 Act did not stop with Section 8-1-7. It also included within its
general provisions applicable to the entire Act Section 8-1-6, which set forth
rules of interpretation and attempted to codify Article VI, Section 39a. 3 3 More
importantly, the Act broadly defined municipal powers. Section 8-11-1(a),
beginning the definition of city powers, provides:
(a) To carry into effect the powers and authority conferred upon
any municipality or its governing body by the provisions of this
chapter, or any past or future act of the Legislature of this state,
the governing body has plenary power and authority to:
(1) Make and pass all needful ordinances, orders, bylaws, acts,
resolutions, rules and regulations not contrary to the
Constitution and laws of this state; and
(2) Prescribe reasonable penalties for violation of its ordinances,
orders, bylaws, acts, resolutions, rules and regulations, in the
form of fines, forfeitures and confinement in the county or

Id. (emphasis added).
163 W. Va. 285, 256 S.E.2d 557 (1979).
31
Id. at 290, 256 S.E.2d at 561.
32
See Robinson v. City of Bluefield, 234 W. Va. 209, 764 S.E.2d 740 (2014); McCallister v.
Nelson, 186 W. Va. 131, 411 S.E.2d 456 (1991); Sharon Steel Corp. v. City of Fairmont, 175 W.
Va. 479, 334 S.E.2d 616 (1985); City of Fairmont v. Inv'rs Syndicate of Am., Inc., 172 W. Va.
431, 307 S.E.2d 467 (1983). McCallistersustained a city's creation of a mayoral veto-though
state law did not expressly authorize that device-and included language recognizing Article VI,
Section 39a's grant of power to cities to enact any law not inconsistent with state law. 186 W. Va.
at 134-35, 411 S.E.2d at 459-60. And Sharon allowed a city to use its common law nuisance
power to affect an environmental regulation. 175 W. Va. at 489, 334 S.E.2d at 626-27. Robinson,
however, brought back strict construction of municipal power with a vengeance. 234 W. Va. at
215, 764 S.E.2d at 746.
33
Section 8-1-6 is not a model of clarity, which might explain why it has not received much
attention.
29
30
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regional jail or the place of confinement in the municipality, if
there is one, for a term not exceeding thirty days.
There's more. In Section 8-12-2, titled "Home Rule Power for Cities,"
the Act in subsection (a) provides that "any city shall have plenary power and
authority by charter provision . .. or by ordinance not inconsistent or in conflict"
with state law "to provide for the government, regulation and control of the city's
municipal affairs." 34 The section then goes on to set forth a non-exhaustive list
of 11 broadly stated powers.3 5
Later in Article 12, the Act lists the "General Powers of Municipalities
Governing
Bodies." Section 8-12-5 currently sets forth 59 separate powers,
and
including "(44) [The power to] protect and promote the public morals, safety,
health, welfare and good order."36 That, of course, is the classic statement of the
general police power, which permits governments to regulate anything in any
manner not prohibited by the constitution or, in this case, by state statute.
It is difficult to imagine a state code that is clearer in its conferral of
broad municipal regulatory powers. 3 7 Nevertheless, courts-both the Supreme

34
3

§ 8-12-2.
These powers follow:
(1) The creation or discontinuance of departments of the city's government
and the prescription, modification or repeal of their powers and duties;
(2) The transaction of the city's business;
(3) The incurring of the city's obligations;
(4) The presentation, ascertainment, disposition and discharge of claims
against the city;
(5) The acquisition, care, management and use of the city's streets, avenues,
roads, alleys, ways and property;
(6) The levy, assessment, collection and administration of such taxes and such
special assessments for benefits conferred, as have been or may be specifically
authorized by the Legislature;
(7) The operation and maintenance of passenger transportation services and
facilities, if authorized by the Public Service Commission, and if so authorized,
such transportation system may be operated without the corporate limits of
such city, but may not be operated within the corporate limits of another
municipality without the consent of the governing body thereof;
(8) The furnishing of all local public services;
(9) The government, protection, order, conduct, safety and health of persons
or property therein;
(10) The adoption and enforcement of local police, sanitary and other similar
regulations; and
(11) The imposition and enforcement of penalties for the violation of any of
the provisions of its charter or of any of its ordinances.

Id.
36

Id. § 8-12-5.

3

The Code did not, however, loosen the constraints on municipal taxing powers.
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Court of Appeals and the circuit courts-have refused to implement the clear
legislative judgment and have instead continued to genuflect at Dillon's Rule.3 8
IV. THE WEST VIRGINIA HOME RULE PILOT PROGRAM

Thus, despite a constitutional provision authorizing home rule for cities
and despite a slew of statutory provisions expressing a vision for broad municipal
powers, judicial nullification continued to make it necessary for cities to run to
Charleston to get some express legislative authorization to exercise any new
municipal authority-and thereby run the risk of creating a presumption that the
grant of a power implies the exclusion of powers not granted.3 9 In response to
the limited discretion that West Virginia cities possessed, the legislature in 2007
tried again to promote greater local flexibility when it created the Municipal
Home Rule Pilot Program. 4 0 The law established a Municipal Home Rule Board
and granted it authority to approve up to five cities to participate in the program.4 1
Cities were to submit their proposed home rule plan and explain how current
state law prevented them from achieving efficient governance.4 2 With Board
approval, cities could amend their plans at any time and could, in effect, receive
waivers from compliance with some state laws found to be inhibiting.43 Only
four cities-Bridgeport, Charleston, Huntington, and Wheeling-participated in
the original program.44 In November of 2012, the Legislative Auditor
Performance Evaluation and Research Division concluded its assessment of the
program and filed a special recommendation that the legislature consider

See supra note 32 (collecting cases); infra note 39 (providing illustrations).
39
Even an express grant was not always a guarantee of municipal authority. In Robinson v.
City of Bluefield, the city attempted to rely on the express grant in Section 8-12-5(26) authorizing
it "[t]o regulate or prohibit the keeping of animals or fowls and to provide for the impounding, sale
or destruction of animals or fowls kept contrary to law or found running at large." 234 W. Va. 209,
212, 764 S.E.2d 740, 743 (2014) (quoting W. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-12-5(26)). The court held that
express grant was superseded by another statute, Section 19-20-20, which authorized magistrate
and circuit courts to order the destruction of vicious dogs. Id. at 214, 764 S.E.2d at 745. Why city
courts could not exercise concurrent jurisdiction over vicious animals with the county courts is not
evident. Similar cases abound. See, e.g., Rogers v. City of South Charleston, 163 W. Va. 285, 289,
256 S.E.2d 557, 560 (1979) (granting cities the power to convey or sell real property did not include
the power to contract for an option to buy city realty).
40
2007 W. Va. Acts 1683-89.
41
Id
38

42

Id

43

Id

Home
Rule
History
in
West
Virginia,
CITY
https://www.fairmontwv.gov/367/Home-Rule-History-in-West-Virginia.
4
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45
extending broad-based home rule to all of the State's Class I, II, and III cities.
The legislature revisited the pilot program in 2014 and extended participation for
up to 20 cities, including the existing 4.46 A 2015 law raised the number to 30
Class I, II, and III cities and further authorized inclusion of up to four Class IV
towns. 47 As of March 2019, 34 of West Virginia's 231 cities were operating
under the home rule pilot program.4 8 Finally, the legislature in 2019 made the
program permanent and extended the opportunity for participation to all West
Virginia cities, although limiting the number of new Class IV admittees to four
per year.49

V. THE WEST VIRGINIA HOME RULE PROGRAM
A.

Description

Section 8-1-5a, the "Municipal Home Rule Program," has several
distinctive features, some of which are unique to the state. The legislative
findings included conclusions about the Pilot Program's success for having
"brought innovative results, including novel municipal ideas that became
municipal ordinances which later resulted in new statewide statutes.
Subsection (c)(1) extended the opportunity for home rule to all Class I, II, and
III cities and provided for approval of applications for the four Class IV towns
per year.5 1 A new subsection-(c)(3)-provides that participating cities shall pay
an annual assessment of $2,000 "for the operation and administration of the
W. VA. LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, SPECIAL
(2012), http://www.wvlegislature.gov/Joint/P
ERD/perdrep/HomeRule_11_2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XXX-UK3X] [hereinafter AUDITOR'S
REPORT]. Per the constitutional directive in Article VI, Section 39a, the legislature has classified
West Virginia's municipalities into four classes, according to population: I (over 50,000), II
(10,000 to 50,000), III (2,000 to 10,000), and IV (under 2,000). W. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-1-3 (West
2020); see also W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 39a.
46
2014 W. Va. Acts 1037-59.
47
2015 W. Va. Acts 1840-48.
48
Shauna Johnson, Home Rule Is Becoming a Permanent Optionfor West Virginia's Cities,
W. VA. METRONEWS (Mar. 27, 2019, 12:54 PM), http://wvmetronews.com/2019/03/27/home-ruleis-becoming-a-permanent-option-for-west-virginias-cities/; accord DAVID HARDY, W. VA. MUN.
HOME RULE BD., WEST VIRGINIA HOME RULE PILOT PROGRAM SUMMARY REPORT 2018, at 2
(2019),
https://revenue.wv.gov/HomeRule/Documents/AnnualSummaryReports/HomeRule.AnnualSum
maryReport.2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/7BFF-DLHZ].
49
S.B. 4, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2019).
5o
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-1-5a(a)(1) (West 2020). The findings also noted the challenges that
cities face delivering essential services and the constraints placed on some cities by state laws and
policies. Id. §§ 8-1-5a(a)(4), 8-1-5a(a)(5).
45

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION & RESEARCH Div.,
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Id. § 8-1-5a(c)(1).
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Home Rule Board." 52 Any balance in the fund into which the fees are paid that
remains at the end of the fiscal year will remain in a special revenue account "for
uses consistent with the provisions" of the home rule section.5 3
The statute continued the practice of the more recent statutes of creating
a five-member Home Rule Board consisting of the governor or a designee; the
Executive Director of the West Virginia Development Office or a designee;
representatives of the Business and Industry Council; representatives of the
state's largest labor organization; and representatives of the American Planning
Association, all appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the
senate.54
The Board retains the power to grant cities relief from state laws that
interfere with or obstruct their ability to advance their best interests. The city's
application for special dispensation must describe how state law prevents "the
municipality from carrying out its duties" in an efficient and effective manner.
For example, Charles Town found burdensome a state law that prohibited alcohol
sales in restaurants before 1 p.m. on Sundays.55 This prevented the city's
restaurants and bed-and-breakfast inns from competing with restaurants in
Maryland and Virginia (where alcohol was available much earlier) for the
lucrative Sunday brunch business. So the city asked the Home Rule Board to
approve an amendment to its plan that would allow alcohol sales on Sundays
after 10 a.m., notwithstanding state law.56 The amendment was allowed, and the
legislature subsequently changed state law to permit earlier Sunday alcohol
sales.57
Similarly, Morgantown had a unique (within the state) problem dealing
with university students' propensity to burn furniture (especially mattresses and
couches) on the city's streets and sidewalks following major sporting events.
These frequent fires (an average of 81 fires per year over a 10-year span) cost the
city in terms of police and fire personnel overtime, damage to streets and
52

Id. § 8-1-5a(c)(3).

53
54

Id. § 8-1-5a(c)(5).
Id. § 8-1-5a(d).

5

Rusty Marks, West Virginia'sNew Sunday Alcohol Law Already ChangingBreakfast Game

for Several Cities, W. VA. NEWS (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.wvnews.com/west-virginia-s-newsunday-alcohol-law-already-changing-breakfast/article_85df7Ocb-7301-5480-808a7323258bl59c.html.
56
See Ex. 5 to Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, Jeffries v. City of Charleston, No. 19-C367 (Cir. Ct. Kanawha Cnty. June 25, 2019).
5
Carrie Hodousek, Tomblin Signs "Brunch Bill" to Allow for EarlierSunday Alcohol Sales,
W. VA. METRONEWS (Mar. 29, 2016, 5:42 PM), http://wvmetronews.com/2016/03/29/tomblin-

signs-brunch-bill-to-allow-for-earlier-sunday-alcohol-sales/.
58

Stop

See, e.g., Tyler Kingkade, Morgantown Bans Sofas from Being Kept Outside in Attempt to

WVU

Couch

Fires,

HUFFPOST

(Apr.

9,

2016,

5:16

PM),

https://www.huffpost.com/entry/morgantown-couches-fire_n_7036350.
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sidewalks, and damage to reputation. 59 The city believed that banning use and
storage of indoor furniture and mattresses on porches and other exterior property
would reduce the incidence of these fires, but West Virginia Code Sections 812-13 and 29-3-5B arguably precluded the city from enacting the sought-for
ordinance.60 Thus, to avoid protracted and possibly costly litigation over the
issues presented by state law, the city requested and received Home Rule Board
authorization to enact the ordinance.61
Section 8-1-5a(i) does, however, exclude certain subjects from Home
Rule Board authorization to supersede or obtain a waiver from state law. It
includes matters covered by federal law or the state constitution (which have
preemptive effects on state lawmaking); good government laws (FOIA, bidding
on municipal contracts, and open meetings); laws relating to subjects of
overriding statewide concerns (criminal laws, taxation, public employee
pensions, tax increment financing, building and fire codes, annexation, and
ordinances that could jeopardize the receipt of federal money); or laws relating
to-of course-guns and ammunition.62
59

JEFF MIKORSKI,

CITY OF MORGANTOWN,

APPLICATION

MUNICIPAL

15-18

HOME RULE

PILOT PROGRAM

(2014),

https://revenue.wv.gov/homerule/Documents/Morgantown/Morgantown.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YZ3R-ACJ9].
60
Id. at 17 ("Based upon the language within Sections 8-12-13 and 29-3-5b of the West
Virginia Code, there is a very strong argument that a West Virginia municipality does not have the
authority, on its own, to adopt [the] ordinance."); see also W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-12-13, 29-35B (West 2020).
61
See Ex. 7 to P.'s Resp. to Def's Mot. to Dismiss, Jeffries v. City of Charleston, No. 19-C367 (Cir. Ct. Kanawha Cnty. June 25, 2019).
62
There are a few additional subjects without easily identifiable rationales. The entirety of
Section 8-1-5a(i) reads as follows:
(1) The municipalities participating in the Municipal Home Rule Program may
not pass an ordinance, act, resolution, rule, or regulation, under the provisions
of this section, that is contrary to the following:
(1) Environmental law;
(2) Laws governing bidding on government construction and other contracts;
(3) The Freedom of Information Act;
(4) The Open Governmental Proceedings Act;
(5) Laws governing wages for construction of public improvements;
(6) The provisions of this section;
(7) The provisions of §8-12-5a of this code;
(8) The municipality's written plan;
(9) The Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the State of
West Virginia;
(10) Federal law, including those governing crimes and punishment;
(11) Chapters 60A, 61, and 62 of this code or any other provisions of this code
governing state crimes and punishment;
(12) Laws governing pensions or retirement plans;
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B. Analysis
Section 8-1-5a accomplishes the goals of home rule but does so in a
unique way. It is not the only home rule statute that mixes legislative and
imperium in imperio home rule,63 but its method is singular.64 The section leaves

(13) Laws governing annexation;
(14) Laws governing taxation: Provided, That a participating municipality may
enact a municipal sales tax up to one percent if it reduces or eliminates its
municipal business and occupation tax: Provided, however, That if a
municipality subsequently reinstates or raises the municipal business and
occupation tax it previously reduced or eliminated under the Municipal Home
Rule Pilot Program or the Municipal Home Rule Program, it shall reduce or
eliminate the municipal sales tax enacted under the Municipal Home Rule Pilot
Program or the Municipal Home Rule Program in an amount comparable to
the revenue estimated to be generated by the reinstated tax: Provided further,
That any municipality that imposes a municipal sales tax pursuant to this
section shall use the services of the Tax Commissioner to administer, enforce,
and collect the tax required by the provisions of § 11-15-1 et seq., § Il-1 5A-1
et seq., and § 11-1 5B- 1 et seq. of this code and all applicable provisions of the
Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement: And provided further, That the tax
does not apply to the sale of motor fuel or motor vehicles;
(15) Laws governing tax increment financing;
(16) Laws governing extraction of natural resources;
(17) Marriage and divorce laws;
(18) Laws governing professional licensing or certification, including the
administration and oversight of those laws, by state agencies to the extent
required by law;
(19) Laws, rules, or regulations governing the enforcement of state building or
fire codes;
(20) Federal laws, regulations, or standards that would affect the state's
required compliance or jeopardize federal funding;
(21) Laws or rules governing procurement of architectural and engineering
services: Provided, That notwithstanding any other provision of this section to
the contrary, the change made in this subdivision applies prospectively and
any ordinance enacted by the participating municipalities prior to the effective
date of the amendments to this section during the 2019 regular legislative
session and pursuant to the Municipal Home Rule Pilot Program remains in
effect.
(22) The provisions of chapter 17C of this code; or
(23) Laws, rules, or regulations governing communication technologies or
telecommunications carriers, as the term "telecommunications carrier" is
defined by the Federal Communications Commission in 47 U.S.C. § 153 or as
determined by the Public Service Commission of West Virginia.
(24) Laws governing the sale, transfer, possession, use, storage, taxation,
registration, licensing, or carrying firearms, ammunition, or accessories
thereof.
See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-1-5a(i) (West 2020).
63
See, e.g., IOWA CONST. art. III, § 38A.
64
"The [c]ourt recognizes that the State of West Virginia has a unique and individualized
approach to home rule authority. This approach is unlike any other state in this Union." See Order
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in place the legislative home rule model contemplated by Article VI, Section 39a
and West Virginia Code Section 8-12-2, in which a city may enact any law
relating to its municipal affairs not inconsistent with state law 65 but also creates
a form of imperio immunity by allowing cities to address local matters and
override state laws with the consent and authorization of the Home Rule Board.
The section avoids the problems created by the restrictive judicial readings of the
imperio immunity relating to what constitutes local or municipal affairs 66 by
legislatively defining the subjects that are state matters outside the local
immunity and assigning the task of determining specific local needs for
protection from state law to the Home Rule Board. 67 The Board, in granting or
denying immunity requests, can account for statewide concerns. This method
recognizes the need for local solutions to local problems while simultaneously
8
screening off courts from continuing to undermine home rule.6
VI. CONSTITUTIONALITY

The question of Section 8-1-5a's constitutionality has been raised in
Jeffries v. City of Charleston,6 9 a Kanawha Circuit Court challenge to the Home
Rule Board's approval of Charleston's imposition of a sales tax following a
reduction in its business and occupation tax. Section 8-1-5a(i)(14) removes from
Home Rule Board power the ability to grant immunities from state tax law, but
it also includes a proviso that a home rule city may enact a sales tax of up to 1%
if it simultaneously reduces or eliminates its business and occupation tax. There
is also a separate statutory provision, West Virginia Code Section 8-13C-4, that
authorizes cities to enact a sales tax if they eliminate their business and
occupation tax.7 0 While a complete recitation and analysis of the arguments in

Granting Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, Jeffries v. City of Charleston, No. 19-C-367 (Cir. Ct. Kanawha
Cnty. Jan. 14, 2020), at 11.
65
Of course, the case law described in Part I has thus far greatly limited the effectiveness of
both the constitutional and statutory grants. See infra Part I.
66
See supra notes 32 (collecting cases), 39 (providing illustrations).
67
See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-1-5a(i).
68
Concededly, the Home Rule Board could become as hostile to local control as courts have
been, but the experience under the Pilot Program would suggest that the Board would be a much
more receptive forum for cities than courts have been. See, e.g., AUDITOR'S REPORT, supra note
45. In addition, judicial review of a Home Rule Board's decision remains a possibility, although,
to the author's knowledge, no direct appeals have occurred to date.
69
No. 19-C-367 (Cir. Ct. Kanawha Cnty. 2019).
70
As of January 1, 2019, the Home Rule Board authorized 31 cities to enact the alternative
sales tax, of which 28 had implemented the tax. See HARDY, supra note 48, at 23.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol122/iss3/4

14

Bastress: Home Rule in West Virginia
2020]

HOME RULE IN WEST VIRGINIA

735

that litigation are beyond the scope of this Article, some summary and comments
on the issues are appropriate.71
First, the plaintiff uses Article VI, Section 39a as a restriction on the
legislature's capacity to confer powers on cities, rather than as an expansion of
municipal power. He cites to the requirement that the legislature shall provide by
general laws for the governance of cities and for limiting the rate of municipal
taxes. According to the plaintiff, by creating the opportunity for cities to seek
exemptions from state law and to seek the power to enact a sales tax without
meeting all of the limitations imposed in West Virginia Code Section 8-13C-4,
Section 8-1-5a provides for the regulation of cities and municipal taxes by local
law, not general law. In effect, the argument goes, the power of the Home Rule
Board to grant immunities to state laws renders those laws something less than
"general laws." The catch is that Section 8-1-5a is a general law; it now creates
the opportunity for all West Virginia cities to seek home rule status and to enact
a sales tax upon a reduction or elimination of the business and occupation tax.
The statute does not require participation, but the opportunity is there for all cities
to use the law-just as Section 8-13C-4 authorizes cities to enact a sales tax upon
elimination of the business and occupation tax. The legislature creates the
opportunity, but it is up to each city to decide whether to take advantage of either
law.
Second, the plaintiff argues that Section 8-1-5a contradicts both West
Virginia Constitution Article VI, Section 39a and West Virginia Code Section 812-2(a) because those provisions provide that municipal laws that conflict with
state law are invalid.72 True enough, but if a city enacts a law pursuant to
authority granted by the Home Rule Board and Section 8-1-5a, then the
ordinance is not in conflict with state law. It would be perfectly consistent with
the law as established by Section 8-1-5a. Similarly, if the Home Rule Board
authorizes a city to enact a sales tax upon the "reduction" of the business and
occupation tax-rather than upon its "elimination" as required by Section 8-13C4-the city's enactment of the tax would be consistent with state law.
Third, the Jeffries plaintiff contends that Section 8-1-5a(i)'s
authorization to the Home Rule Board to permit a city's enactment of a sales tax
is an unconstitutional delegation of the tax power, citing West Virginia
Constitution Article X, Sections 1 and 9 and Article VI, Section 39a. The Article
X, Section 1 language relied upon states, "taxation shall be equal and uniform
throughout the state, and all property, both real and personal, shall be taxed in
proportion to its value." 73 This limitation, however, applies only to property taxes

7
Since Jeffries's other arguments are specific to the Charleston ordinance and are irrelevant
for present purposes, this Article does not address them.
72
Order Granting Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, Jeffries v. City of Charleston, No. 19-C-367 (Cir.
Ct. Kanawha Cnty. Jan. 14, 2020), at 11.
7
W. VA. CONST. art. X, § 1.
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and only within a particular taxing jurisdiction (typically, a county and, to a
limited extent, the state in its imposition of a statewide property tax). 74 That
conclusion is evident from the succeeding sentences in Section 1, which provide
that no one species of property may be taxed higher than another but then create
(thanks to the Tax Limitation Amendment of 1932) four classes of property, each
with its own cap on the rate of taxation.7 ' The section has no application to sales
taxes.7 6
Article X, Section 9 provides that "[t]he legislature may, by law,
authorize the corporate authorities of cities, towns and villages, for corporate
purposes, to assess and collect taxes; but such taxes shall be uniform, with respect
to persons and property within the jurisdiction of the authority imposing the
same."77 The section is largely superfluous. The legislature would undoubtedly
have the power to authorize municipal taxes even in the absence of Section 9,
and Section 1's "equal and uniform" clause already imposed the uniformity
requirement repeated in Section 9. In any event, Section 9 applies only to taxes
on "persons and property within the jurisdiction" (here a city), which likely
would not apply to sales taxes and would certainly not be offended by a sales tax
78
assessed at a uniform rate within a city.

The language of Article VI, Section 39a relied upon by the Jeffries
plaintiff states that the legislature "shall limit the rate of taxes for municipal
purposes, in accordance with section one, article ten." 7 9 The reference to the
limits in Article X, Section 1 suggests that the limitation applies only to property
taxes, but even if stretched to apply to municipal sales taxes, Section 8-1-5a(i)
satisfies it. The subsection provides that a city may impose a sales tax "up to one
percent." That is a limit on the rate of taxation.
The textual provisions relied upon by the Jeffries plaintiff do not
expressly limit the legislature's power to delegate the tax power, no caselaw
supports the contention that the legislature cannot delegate the taxing power, and
Article X, Section 9 specifically provides that the legislature can authorize
municipal taxes. Section 8-1-5a(i) authorizes a municipal sales tax but makes it
contingent upon a reduction or elimination of the business and occupation tax
and upon the approval of the Home Rule Board. That is entirely consistent with
the legislative powers prescribed by Article X, Sections 1 and 9 and by Article
VI, Section 39a.
See, e.g., Killen v. Logan Cty. Comm'n, 170 W. Va. 602, 295 S.E.2d 689 (1982), overruled
74
on other grounds by In re Tax Assessment of Foster Found.'s Woodlands Ret. Cmty., 223 W. Va.
14, 672 S.E.2d 150 (2008).
7

BASTRESS, supra note 10, at 284-87.

76

Id.

7

W. VA. CONST. art. X,

78

§ 9.
See BASTRESS, supra note 10, at 309.

7

W. VA. CONST. art. VI,

§ 39a.
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Finally, the plaintiff contends in his case that Section 8-1-5a fails to set
forth adequate guidance for the Home Rule Board in making its decisions and
thus constitutes an excessive delegation of legislative power. To be sure, the
statute does not provide a set of specific criteria to be implemented, but there is
some direction provided. The findings in Section 8-1-5a(a) declare that
(4) [m]unicipalities still face challenges delivering services
required by federal and state law or demanded by their
constituents; (5) [m]unicipalities are sometimes restrained by
state statutes, policies, and rules that challenge their ability to
carry out their duties and responsibilities in a cost-effective,
efficient, and timely manner; [and] [e]stablishing the Municipal
Home Rule Pilot Program as a permanent program is in the
public interest.
In its subsection (e), the statute empowers the Board to
(1) Review, evaluate, make recommendations, and approve or
reject, for any lawful reason, by a majority vote of the board,
each aspect of the written plan, or the written plan in its entirety,
submitted by a municipality;
(2) By a majority vote of the board, select, based on the
municipality's written plan, new Class I, Class II, Class III,
and/or Class IV municipalities to participate in the Municipal
Home Rule Program;
(3) Review, evaluate, make recommendations, and approve or
reject, for any lawful reason, by a majority vote of the board, the
amendments to the existing approved written plans submitted by
municipalities: Provided, That any new application or
amendment that does not reasonably demonstrate the
municipality's ability to manage its associated costs or liabilities
shall be rejected;
(4) Consult with any agency affected by the written plans or the
amendments to the existing approved written plans; and
(5) Perform any other powers or duties necessary to effectuate
the provisions of this section: Provided, That any administrative
rules established by the board for the operation of the Municipal
Home Rule Program shall be published on the Municipal Home
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Rule Board's website, and made available to the public in print
upon request.80
While this guidance lacks specificity, it is also true that the judicial

standards for measuring the sufficiency of a legislative delegation are quite lax
due to the difficulty of articulating manageable doctrines." The West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals has stated that a legislative delegation "must be
sufficient to guide [the] agency in the exercise of the power conferred upon it." 82
"Generally, the standard is lenient, as courts require only some minimum level
of guidance through articulated standards." 8 3 Applying the standard to Section 81-5a leads to the conclusion that the legislature has provided the Home Rule
Board with adequate guidance: it must review and decide on home rule
applications and amendments based upon whether the applying city has
demonstrated the need for greater flexibility or for relief from state laws or
policies to carry out its duties in an effective, efficient, and timely manner.
Furthermore, the statute specifically lists the subject areas that are not within the
Board's jurisdiction. 84 That combination should be sufficient to satisfy the
standards applicable to the legislative delegation doctrine.
On January 14, 2020, Kanawha Circuit Judge Louis H. Bloom entered
an Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, rejecting plaintiffs
challenges to the Charleston sales tax ordinance and to the home rule statute. The
court found that "the Legislature provided adequate standards to guide" the
Home Rule Board in administering the statute and did not grant to the Board
unbridled authority.85 The court also noted that the 2019 Act had expressly
authorized those municipal ordinances that had been enacted by participating
cities under the prior home rule pilot program. That legislation affirmation would
embrace the Charleston sales tax ordinance.

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-1-5a(e) (West 2020).
Indeed, the federal standard asks only "whether Congress has laid down by legislative act
an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to take action is directed to
conform." J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). Furthermore, the
U.S. Supreme Court has ruled in only two cases-ever-that a congressional delegation was
inadequate, and those cases were both decided in 1935. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); see also
GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 433-37 (8th ed. 2017) (illustrating that there
are very few-if any-constitutional restraints on Congress's delegation power).
82
State ex rel. W. Va. Citizens Action Grp. v. W. Va. Econ. Dev. Grant Comm'n, 213 W. Va.
255, 580 S.E.2d 869 (2003) (quoting Quesenberry v. Estep, 142 W. Va. 426, 95 S.E.2d 832 (1956)).
83
BASTRESS, supra note 10, at 155.
84
See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-1-5a(i) (West 2020); supra note 62 (reciting these provisions).
85
Order Granting Def's Mot. to Dismiss, Jeffries v. City of Charleston, No. 19-C-367 (Cir.
Ct. Kanawha Cnty. Jan. 14, 2020), at 8.
80
8
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CONCLUSION

The West Virginia Home Rule Act, West Virginia Code Section 8-1-5a,
offers municipalities in the state the opportunity to fashion local solutions to local
problems in a broad range of matters that do not implicate statewide interests and
in spite of what might otherwise be constrictive state laws or policies. Moreover,
it confers this opportunity without initial exposure to judicial nullification, as has
occurred with previous constitutional and statutory efforts to enhance local
control.
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